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INTEGRITY IN ENGINEERING |
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AVIONICS ADVANCEMENT |
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THE SAFETY EQUATIONS |
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Home > Why Cirrus?
> Integrity in Engineering
> CAPSTM &
Stall/ Spin |
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CAPSTM
and Stall/Spin
Probably no technology that
Cirrus has introduced has been
more revolutionary to the
aviation industry than CAPS
(Cirrus Aircraft Parachute
System). Certainly none has been
more controversial.
A discussion of CAPS can strike
at the heart of why many of us
become pilots: we learn to rely
on ourselves; we are taught from
the beginning to deal with
equipment failure; we absorb
expressions like, “Superior
pilots use their superior
judgment to avoid using their
superior skill.” We are
uncomfortable with the idea of
needing help, of getting in so
far over our heads that a
parachute need ever be
contemplated.
There were similar reactions in
the military to ejection seats.
That discussion ended decades
ago and few would question them
today. The same has happened
with CAPS in recent years.
Today, CAPS has been accepted by
Cirrus owners as an immensely
valuable asset. Over twenty
people have been rescued in 12
uses from situations including
in-flight incapacitation,
spatial disorientation, careless
maintenance, and other loss of
control incidents.
Despite some suggestions to the
contrary, CAPS was an integral
part of the Cirrus SR20
development from initial
conception. Cirrus Co-founder
Alan Klapmeier was inspired
after surviving a mid-air
collision early in his flying
career. He wanted the SR20 to
have some form of life saving
device for when the pilot lost
control of the airplane. Even in
the mid-nineteen nineties,
Cirrus saw parachutes proving
themselves in the ultra-light
arena and ready to be applied to
heavier airplanes.
During CAPS development a
prescient accident investigator
noted, “…we will have a pilot to
interview and an airplane to
look at and we will discover
causes [for accidents] we never
knew existed.” He was right.
CAPS has saved lives in such
varied situations as :
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CAPS (CIRRUS AIRCRAFT PARACHUTE
SYSTEM) |
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CAPS was
designed in from
SR20 conception
Cirrus
Co-founder Alan
Klapmeier was
inspired after
surviving a
mid-air
collision early
in his flying
career. He
wanted the SR20
to have a life
saving device
for when the
pilot lost
control of the
airplane. |
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COMPONENTS PARTS OF CAPS |
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Stalls at altitude with auto-pilot engaged:
letting airspeed decay through downdrafts,
icing encounters, or just running out of
climb rate, etc. This is rarely discussed
but has lead to loss of control and CAPS
use.
-
Airplane washing. Many
aircraft have been seen climbing into a
cloud layer and a pilot then losing control.
Washing the airplane, though, was rarely
thought of as a possible cause. Yet this was
a real life situation for one Cirrus pilot.
-
Pilot Medical issues. Generally viewed as an
obscure risk, it appears that previously
unidentifiable medical conditions have lead
to CAPS use.
Knowledge gained from CAPS will lead to product
and training changes throughout the general
aviation fleet. The lessons learned will be
applicable to all general aviation airplanes –
CAPS equipped or otherwise.
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Parachutes Save Lives. |
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Why Cirrus works so hard at spin
prevention
Modern production airplanes are,
in general, not tested or
certified for spins.
Aerobatic designs such as Extra
and Sukhoi products are, of
course, certified for spins –
but the mainstream general
aviation four-seat designs such
as Cirrus, Cessna (182, 350/400,
etc), Diamond, Mooney, Piper
etc. are not certified for
spins. Few 4-seat designs have
ever been tested or certified
for spins.
“The spin” is a subject that
often raises strong emotions.
Some embrace it with an
almost-religious fervour; others
see uncharted land – “Here be
Dragons.” The reality is simple
in principle (one wing is
flying, the other stalled) but
subtle differences in aircraft
design can create very different
entry and recovery
characteristics.
For most pilots recognizing the
early stages of a spin, or
recovering a developed spin, is
unlikely in any kind of
airplane. Not necessarily
because of airplane
characteristics but because a
generation of pilots have not
been required to receive
training in spin recognition or
recovery.
At Cirrus, our focus on spins is
about prevention.
From a general aviation (travelling
A to B) point of view there is
no reason to look at spins as
anything but a “loss of
control.” Spins were eliminated
from basic flight training three
decades ago; recovery from a
developed spin is long gone from
certification tests; FAA data
suggests less than 3% of
inadvertent spins are ever
recovered (regardless of the
airplane’s capabilities), and
probably none at low altitude.
In short, modern general
aviation airplanes are not
certified for spins, nor are
pilots equipped to recover them.
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PLACARDS PROHIBITING SPINS
(CIRRUS & CESSNA 350/400) |
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Virtually all
pilots practice
stalls in
training
flights. The
inadvertent
stall is very
different …
In an
inadvertent
stall you, the
pilot, are not
thinking or
expecting
“stall.” You are
probably
distracted (why
else would you
stall in the
first place?)
and likely
uncoordinated.
You sense the
rolling motion
but feel it is a
bump or minor
turbulence. You
are not thinking
“rudder” or
“step on the
high wing.”
Think of the
“base to final”
turn.
In a Cirrus
aircraft, the
ailerons offer
superior
low-speed
effectiveness -
even when the
inboard section
of the wing may
be stalled.
Without this
design
advantage,
applying aileron
during a stall
risks
aggravating the
stall and raises
the very real
possibility of
inadvertant spin
entry.
While rolling
the airplane
level does not
alone recover
the stall, it
does give you a
fighting chance
to recognize and
recover this
potentially
fatal mistake. |
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Spin Prevention
Cirrus chose, in the very
earliest stages of designing the
SR20 to take on the challenge:
to minimise the risks associated
with inadvertently stalling an
airplane. The approach chosen
was to employ wing technology
developed by NASA reducing the
potential for spin entry after
an inadvertent stall. The most
visible aspect is the
discontinuous leading edge
dividing the wing into distinct
parts.
Passive technology like this is
highly regarded in safety
circles since no skill or
training is needed to gain the
benefits. In the automotive
world “traction control” is
reported to reduce (single
vehicle) accidents up to 67%.
And the drivers involved never
knew.
At the time Cirrus was not the
only company looking at this
approach: The then Lancair
Company used this technology on
the Columbia 300 (later, with an
avionics change, the Columbia
350). The now Cessna 350 still
has the benefit of this
technology.
It was clearly understood by
NASA, Cirrus, Lancair and FAA
engineers that these features
could affect spin recovery. The
challenge for Cirrus, Lancair
and the FAA was that a new
certification environment would
be needed. FAA engineers
accepted the challenge, worked
with Cirrus and Lancair, and
used their ELOS (Equivalent
Level of Safety) authority to
develop new standards that
accomodated both the Cirrus line
of (SR20/SR22) airplanes and the
Lancair/Columbia/Cessna
300-series.
In the Cirrus case CAPS was
being developed independently.
Combined with enhanced stall
characteristics the FAA found
that the whole package was
potentially much safer than
traditional standards. The "ELOS"
was a very straightforward
alanlysis: beyond any other
discussion CAPS was a way to
deal with the off-chance that a
spin was allowed to develop. All
understood that pilot skill
could not be relied upon.
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Was this all necessary
?
Opinion: No, the Cirrus
would have been certified
anyway:
The European
authorities (initially JAA,
later EASA) when first
evaluating the Cirrus SR20
agreed with the principles of
the FAA/ELOS approach but had
some further questions. A series
of spins was performed on their
initiative. While not a complete
formal program they reported no
unusual characteristics.
Cirrus: Yes it was necessary:
Regardless of anything in the
spin area, future designs (from
Cirrus and others) need to
disregard spins:
The fact remains that a
generation of pilots has not
received spin training – and
from the record of prior
generations it wouldn’t matter
if they had. Cirrus continues to
go forward with aircraft designs
that meet these higher “passive
safety” standards regardless of
the implication for spin
recovery; and is committed to
CAPS as a means to recover from
all “loss of control” situations
– including spins. |
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AIR FLOW OVER A STALLED CIRRUS
WING |
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How does
this wing design
work?
The
outboard section
of the Cirrus
wing flies with
a lower angle of
attack than the
inboard section.
When the inboard
section, which
produces much of
the lift, stalls
the outboard
section, where
the ailerons
are, is still
flying. The
result is that a
stalled Cirrus
airplane can be
controlled
intuitively
using aileron.
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What is this "ELOS
Authority?"
When formulating
design
regulations, the
FAA anticipated
that new
technologies
might come along
that don't meet
the rules -
because they
were not
anticipated -
but otherwise
have significant
potential to
enhance safety.
FAA engineers
have two tools
to enable
benefit from
such advances:
Special
Conditions
can be
used to define
acceptable
standards for a
new,
unanticipated
technology. This
avenue is used
to require
consideration of
HIRF (High
Intensity Radio
Fields) that was
historically not
considered
significant. It
was also used to
define the
standards for
whole-aircraft
parachutes,
which Cirrus
used for CAPS.
ELOS (Equivalent
Level of Safety)
findings are
used when a
traditional rule
must be broken
to realize some
new benefit. The
idea is that
pursuing this
approach makes
an aircraft on
balance
potentially
safer than the
Part 23
“hypothetical.”
This is not
simply waiving a
rule – which
only occurs in
extraordinary
circumstances –
but making
tradeoffs for
the greater
good.
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